Content Centric Networking (CCN) has introduced new concepts and ideas in the next generation routing protocols research area, proposing an alternative approach to the well known and consolidated TCP/IP protocol suite. CCN envisions a network of smart caching devices that not only transport bits from one place to another but also support the network to provide end users with what they are really interested in: named data. However, while a large portion of the existing literature highlights the benefits of this new network paradigm, we focus on some specific security issues related to the opportunity of mounting distributed denial of service attacks, commonly known as Interest Flooding Attack (IFA). Our results confirm this possibility and assess the behavior of state of the art tools designed to mitigate this problem. We run different simulation campaigns in a real deployment scenario to support our evaluation.

Interest Flooding Attack Countermeasures Assessment on Content Centric Networking / Virgilio, Matteo; Marchetto, Guido; Sisto, Riccardo. - STAMPA. - (2015), pp. 721-724. (Intervento presentato al convegno International Conference on Information Technology: New Generations (ITNG 2015) tenutosi a Las Vegas, Nevada, USA nel April 13-15, 2015) [10.1109/ITNG.2015.122].

Interest Flooding Attack Countermeasures Assessment on Content Centric Networking

VIRGILIO, MATTEO;MARCHETTO, GUIDO;SISTO, Riccardo
2015

Abstract

Content Centric Networking (CCN) has introduced new concepts and ideas in the next generation routing protocols research area, proposing an alternative approach to the well known and consolidated TCP/IP protocol suite. CCN envisions a network of smart caching devices that not only transport bits from one place to another but also support the network to provide end users with what they are really interested in: named data. However, while a large portion of the existing literature highlights the benefits of this new network paradigm, we focus on some specific security issues related to the opportunity of mounting distributed denial of service attacks, commonly known as Interest Flooding Attack (IFA). Our results confirm this possibility and assess the behavior of state of the art tools designed to mitigate this problem. We run different simulation campaigns in a real deployment scenario to support our evaluation.
2015
978-1-4799-8827-3
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11583/2588564
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