This paper compares the impacts of traditional one–way access obligations and the new regulatory scheme of co-investment on the roll-out of network infrastructures. We show that compulsory access leads to smaller roll-out, first because it reduces the returns from investment, and second because in the presence of uncertainty it provides access seekers with an option whose exercise hurts investors. Co-investment without access obligations leads to risk sharing and eliminates the access option, implying highest network coverage. Allowing for access on top of co-investment actually decreases welfare if the access price is low.

Cooperative Investment, Access, and Uncertainty / Bourreau, M.; Cambini, C.; Hoernig, S.. - In: INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION. - ISSN 0167-7187. - STAMPA. - 56:(2018), pp. 78-106. [10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.11.004]

Cooperative Investment, Access, and Uncertainty

Cambini C.;
2018

Abstract

This paper compares the impacts of traditional one–way access obligations and the new regulatory scheme of co-investment on the roll-out of network infrastructures. We show that compulsory access leads to smaller roll-out, first because it reduces the returns from investment, and second because in the presence of uncertainty it provides access seekers with an option whose exercise hurts investors. Co-investment without access obligations leads to risk sharing and eliminates the access option, implying highest network coverage. Allowing for access on top of co-investment actually decreases welfare if the access price is low.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11583/2694090
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